When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently.
Historically, we have been rather lax about malformed framing-related headers in our HTTP/2 implementation, as they cannot interfere with HTTP/2 framing. However, this makes it possible for our HTTP/2 implementation to forward responses containing such headers to an HTTP/1 client when acting as a reverse proxy. If the HTTP/1 client also does not behave strictly enough, this can result in response smuggling.
A malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values.
The HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control.
HTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder's table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server.
This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [golang.org/x/net](https://pkg.go.dev/golang.org/x/net) | [`v0.57.0` → `v0.60.0`](https://cs.opensource.google/go/x/net/+/refs/tags/v0.57.0...refs/tags/v0.60.0) |  |  |
---
### HTTP/2 server memory exhaustion due to Trailer headers in net/http
[CVE-2026-78659](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78659) / [GO-2026-6603](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6603)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
#### Details
When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently.
#### Severity
Unknown
#### References
- [https://go.dev/cl/847185](https://go.dev/cl/847185)
- [https://go.dev/cl/847314](https://go.dev/cl/847314)
- [https://go.dev/issue/81857](https://go.dev/issue/81857)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/ZPwCyRUuGBs](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/ZPwCyRUuGBs)
This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6603) and the [Go Vulnerability Database](https://github.com/golang/vulndb) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/golang/vulndb#license)).
</details>
---
### HTTP/2 transport accepts malformed framing-related headers in net/http
[CVE-2026-78660](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78660) / [GO-2026-6610](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6610)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
#### Details
Historically, we have been rather lax about malformed framing-related headers in our HTTP/2 implementation, as they cannot interfere with HTTP/2 framing. However, this makes it possible for our HTTP/2 implementation to forward responses containing such headers to an HTTP/1 client when acting as a reverse proxy. If the HTTP/1 client also does not behave strictly enough, this can result in response smuggling.
#### Severity
Unknown
#### References
- [https://go.dev/cl/835145](https://go.dev/cl/835145)
- [https://go.dev/cl/836385](https://go.dev/cl/836385)
- [https://go.dev/issue/81115](https://go.dev/issue/81115)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI)
This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6610) and the [Go Vulnerability Database](https://github.com/golang/vulndb) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/golang/vulndb#license)).
</details>
---
### Excessive CPU consumption from repeated initial window changes in net/http
[CVE-2026-78669](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78669) / [GO-2026-6611](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6611)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
#### Details
A malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values.
#### Severity
Unknown
#### References
- [https://go.dev/cl/847186](https://go.dev/cl/847186)
- [https://go.dev/cl/847308](https://go.dev/cl/847308)
- [https://go.dev/issue/81742](https://go.dev/issue/81742)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/ZPwCyRUuGBs](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/ZPwCyRUuGBs)
This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6611) and the [Go Vulnerability Database](https://github.com/golang/vulndb) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/golang/vulndb#license)).
</details>
---
### Double flow control refund on HTTP/2 server streams in net/http
[CVE-2026-78663](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78663) / [GO-2026-6612](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6612)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
#### Details
The HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control.
#### Severity
Unknown
#### References
- [https://go.dev/cl/847187](https://go.dev/cl/847187)
- [https://go.dev/cl/847310](https://go.dev/cl/847310)
- [https://go.dev/issue/81743](https://go.dev/issue/81743)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/ZPwCyRUuGBs](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/ZPwCyRUuGBs)
This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6612) and the [Go Vulnerability Database](https://github.com/golang/vulndb) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/golang/vulndb#license)).
</details>
---
### HTTP/2 server crash due to HPACK encoder race in net/http
[CVE-2026-97032](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97032) / [GO-2026-6617](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6617)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
#### Details
HTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder's table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server.
#### Severity
Unknown
#### References
- [https://go.dev/cl/847188](https://go.dev/cl/847188)
- [https://go.dev/cl/847313](https://go.dev/cl/847313)
- [https://go.dev/issue/81867](https://go.dev/issue/81867)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/ZPwCyRUuGBs](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/ZPwCyRUuGBs)
This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6617) and the [Go Vulnerability Database](https://github.com/golang/vulndb) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://github.com/golang/vulndb#license)).
</details>
---
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This PR contains the following updates:
v0.57.0→v0.60.0HTTP/2 server memory exhaustion due to Trailer headers in net/http
CVE-2026-78659 / GO-2026-6603
More information
Details
When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Server.MaxHeaderBytes are calculated differently.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
HTTP/2 transport accepts malformed framing-related headers in net/http
CVE-2026-78660 / GO-2026-6610
More information
Details
Historically, we have been rather lax about malformed framing-related headers in our HTTP/2 implementation, as they cannot interfere with HTTP/2 framing. However, this makes it possible for our HTTP/2 implementation to forward responses containing such headers to an HTTP/1 client when acting as a reverse proxy. If the HTTP/1 client also does not behave strictly enough, this can result in response smuggling.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Excessive CPU consumption from repeated initial window changes in net/http
CVE-2026-78669 / GO-2026-6611
More information
Details
A malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Double flow control refund on HTTP/2 server streams in net/http
CVE-2026-78663 / GO-2026-6612
More information
Details
The HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
HTTP/2 server crash due to HPACK encoder race in net/http
CVE-2026-97032 / GO-2026-6617
More information
Details
HTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder's table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server.
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Configuration
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🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate CLI.
ℹ️ Artifact update notice
File name: go.mod
In order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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golang.org/x/sysv0.47.0->v0.48.0golang.org/x/termv0.45.0->v0.46.0golang.org/x/textv0.40.0->v0.42.0